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I. INTRODUCTION
A S in years past, this article will focus primarily on significant de-
velopments in Bankruptcy Law and Creditors Rights and Reme-
dies from the perspective of the Texas practitioner. This article
is not, however, an exhaustive survey of all bankruptcy developments in
the Fifth Circuit or the Texas bankruptcy courts.1 Rather, in keeping with
the Survey's focus on Texas law, this article is limited to significant devel-




In the bankruptcy case with the most practical significance addressed
by the United States Supreme Court during the survey period, the Court
was called upon to solve what has become known as "the banker's di-
lemma," which arises when a depositor/borrower against whom the bank
has setoff rights files for bankruptcy relief. In Citizens Bank v. Strumpf,3
the Court solved, at least in part, the quandary faced when a banker is
placed in the awkward position of having to take steps necessary to pro-
tect setoff rights on the one hand, while not violating the automatic stay
on the other.
In Strumpf, the debtor sought bankruptcy relief at a time when he had
a checking account with, and was in default on, the remaining balance of
a loan from his bank. After Strumpf's bankruptcy filing, the bank placed
what it called an administrative hold on the debtor's account to the extent
of the balance the bank claimed was subject to setoff. Five days later
1. For more expansive coverage of bankruptcy developments during the survey pe-
riod, see Frank W. Koger, New Case Update, in Texas Tech University School of Law lIlH
ANNUAL FARM, RANCH AND AGRi-BuSINEss BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (1995); Gerrit M.
Pronske, Recent Developments; Texas Bankruptcy Court, Texas Federal District Court, Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Bankruptcy Decisions, 1994 STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROF. DEV.
PROGRAM, ADVANCED BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY COURSE, L-1. Similar updates are also
provided at the State Bar of Texas Advanced Consumer Bankruptcy Course and at the
University of Texas School of Law Bankruptcy Conference. Additionally, the Texas Tech
Law Review's Fifth Circuit Symposium typically features an annual update of bankruptcy
developments in the Fifth Circuit.
2. If a case or statutory amendment does not meet these criteria, chances are that it is
not covered in this article. The author has attempted to limit the focus of this article to
issues arising in the enforcement of the debtor/creditor relationship. The reader is urged to
review the Survey articles on Banking Law and Commercial Transactions, which address
related topics such as usury, failed financial institutions, and Article 9 secured transactions.
3. 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995).
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(just over ten days after the petition date), the bank filed a motion for
relief from automatic stay and for setoff. In response, Mr. Strumpf filed a
motion to hold the bank in contempt, claiming that the administrative
hold violated the automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 4 The Supreme Court was faced with striking the balance between
the protections provided by section 362's automatic stay5 and the Bank-
ruptcy Code's express recognition of setoff found in section 553(a). 6
At the outset, the Court determined that the action taken by the bank
was not a setoff because the bank refused to pay its debt to the debtor/
depositor "not permanently and absolutely, but only while it sought relief
under [section] 362(d) from the automatic stay. ''7 Essentially, the Court
found that to disallow an action such as that taken by the bank in
Strumpf, would render the Bankruptcy Code's recognition of setoff rights
meaningless. 8 In other words, to require the bank to pay immediately its
deposit that was clearly subject to a right of setoff would effectively
"divest the creditor of the very thing that supports the right of setoff."9
Under Strumpf, when a bank is in a position where it enjoys a matured
right of setoff against a debtor/depositor's account, it should now take
comfort in the fact that it can freeze the account pending further disposi-
tion by the Court. The prudent lender, however, should seek the most
prompt and expeditious relief possible, not only so that it can achieve the
setoff, but so it can bring the matter to the Court's attention as soon as
possible. 10
The reader is cautioned, however, that the Strumpf opinion does not
address the situation that may arise when there is not a matured right to
setoff at the time of the bankruptcy filing. In Strumpf, the opinion indi-
cates that Mr. Strumpf was already in default, so it appears that Strumpf's
bank was already in a position with a matured setoff right. In such a
context, it may be presumptuous to read Strumpf for more that it allows:
4. Id. at 288.
5. Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code stays most acts or actions that can be taken
against a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
6. Section 553(a) provides in pertinent part:
a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363
of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual
debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case ....
11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1994) (subject to certain exceptions set forth in section 553).
7. Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. at 289. The court held that "setoff has not occurred until three
steps have been taken: (i) a decision to effectuate a setoff, (ii) some action accomplishing
the setoff, and (iii) a recording of the setoff." Id. The Court further noted, however, that
the question of whether a setoff occurred under Section 362 (a)(7) is a matter of federal
law. Id.
8. Id. at 289.
9. Id at 289.
10. The Strumpf opinion states that exercising an administrative freeze "was neither a
taking of possession of respondent's property nor an exercising of control over it, but
merely a refusal to perform its promise." Id at 290. Nevertheless, because the lender is
dealing with estate property, the matter should be brought to the court's attention as soon
as possible, preferably by the lender.
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"[t]he temporary refusal of a creditor to pay a debt that is subject to setoff
against a debt owed by the bankrupt."" Although the logic of Strumpf is
very clear, any prudent lender, or for that matter any party who claims a
right of setoff, needs to be sure that the right exists before taking steps to
exercise such rights.
The Supreme Court has issued at least two other opinions that are
noteworthy in the context of this article. Those opinions, one of which
deals with bankruptcy court jurisdiction, and the other with the Fair Debt




In Celotex Corp. v. Edwards13, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of "related to" jurisdiction. In Celotex, the plaintiffs had recovered ajudgment against Celotex, which was stayed, pending appeal by way of a
supersedeas bond posted by Celotex. After the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
judgment, Celotex filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in another
district. That bankruptcy court issued an injunction that prohibited judg-
ment creditors from proceeding against sureties without the bankruptcy
court's permission. The plaintiffs filed a motion under Federal Rule
65.114 seeking permission to execute on the bond. The district court
granted the motion, which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. The Celotex
bankruptcy court, however, issued what is commonly called a section 105
injunction, staying all proceedings regarding Celotex,15 which included
actions against the sureties superseding the judgments against Celotex.
The Supreme Court noted that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts,
like other federal courts, "is grounded in and limited by statute."'1 6 Spe-
cifically, district courts have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of
bankruptcy proceedings, including those "related to cases under title
11.' 17 The district courts may, in turn, refer bankruptcy proceedings to
the bankruptcy judges for a particular district.18 In Celotex, the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction to enjoin the proceeding against the debtor's
surety was "based on the 'arising under,' 'arising in' or 'related to' lan-
guage of [sections] 1334(b) and 157(a)."' 19 The Court found that the
11. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
12. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1692(o) (West 1988 & Supp. V.).
13. 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995).
14. Rule 65.1 governs proceedings against sureties on supersedeas bonds. See FED. R.
CIv. P. 65.1 (West 1987).
15. Celotex Corp., 115 S.Ct. at 1496. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code provides
bankruptcy courts with broad equitable powers to issue appropriate injunctive relief. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West 1994) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
16. Celotex Corp., 115 S.Ct. at 1498.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1990).
18. Id. § 157(a).
19. Celotex Corp. 115 S. Ct. at 1498.
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bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to stay the actions against the superse-
deas surety because of the extent to which multiple actions against the
sureties would have a direct and potentially harmful effect on any pros-
pects the debtor might have for a reorganization.20 The Supreme Court
found, therefore, that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue a sec-
tion 105 injunction, noting on the one hand that "[c]ongress intended to
grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they
might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with
the bankruptcy estate" 21 while cautioning that a bankruptcy court's "re-
lated to" jurisdiction cannot be limitless.22
Celotex is a useful example of where a bankruptcy court can exercise
"related to" jurisdiction. But whether and to what extent "related to"
jurisdiction can be exercised when the effect or impact on the bankruptcy
estate is minimal or non-existent remains to be seen. Perhaps most tell-
ing about Celotex, however, is its admonition that "whatever test is used,
... bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction over proceedings that have no
effect on the debtor. ' 23 In a number of circuit level opinions that have
been issued since Celotex, it is apparent that the appellate courts are tak-
ing an ever more restrictive view in allowing bankruptcy courts to exer-
cise "related to" jurisdiction unless a direct nexus can be shown.24
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership25 was another
case with jurisdictional implications. Substantively, the issue pending
before the Supreme Court was whether and to what extent a new value
exception to the absolute priority rule exists in the context of Chapter 11
Plan Confirmation. While certiorari was pending, the parties agreed to a
consensual plan of reorganization. 26 The Supreme Court, however, re-
fused the secured lender's request that the Court vacate the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. The Court determined that the settlement ren-
dered the pending appeal moot, and it refused to grant the secured lender
20. The Supreme Court quoted the bankruptcy court, which found that the settlement
of these insurance coverage disputes "may well be the linchpin of Debtor's formulation of
a feasible plan. Absent the confirmation of a feasible plan, Debtor may be liquidated or
cease to exist after a carrion feast by the victors in a race to the courthouse." Id. at 1500
(citing In re Celotex Corp., (Celotex II) 140 B.R. 912, 915 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992)).
21. Celotex Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1499 (citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994
(3rd Cir. 1984)).
22. Id. (citing Board of Governors v. MCorp. Fin., 502 U.S. 32, 40 (1991) (Congress
has vested "limited authority" in bankruptcy courts.))
23. Id. at 1499 n.6 (discussing various circuit level opinions addressing "related to"
jurisdiction).
24. See, e.g., Specialty Mills Inc. v. Citizens State Bank, 51 F.3d 770,774 (8th Cir. 1995)
("For subject matter jurisdiction to exist in a 'related to' action, there must be some nexus
between the civil proceeding and the Title 11 case." In a footnote, the Celotex Corp. opin-
ion provides a good analysis of the historical test for determining "related to" jurisdiction.
For example, the Court cites the Third Circuit as follows: "The usual articulation of the
test for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the
outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being adminis-
tered in bankruptcy .... Celotex Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1499 n.6 (citing Pacor, 743 F.2d at
994) (emphasis in original).
25. 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
26. Id. at 389.
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the extraordinary remedy of vacatur.27
2. Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction in the Fifth Circuit and Other Circuits
The Fifth Circuit's most expansive analysis of "related to" jurisdiction
is found in its recent opinion in In re Zale Corporation.28 In Zale, the
Fifth Circuit expressed a dim view toward a bankruptcy court exercising
jurisdiction over disputes between third parties that have no effect upon
the administration of the estate or that do not otherwise involve estate
assets or the debtor/creditor relationship within the bankruptcy case.29 In
finding that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to issue a per-
manent injunction regarding a matter that did not have a direct impact
upon the debtor or its estate, the Fifth Circuit noted with approval au-
thority from other circuits that makes clear that the mere existence of
shared facts between the third party action and a debtor/creditor conflict
do not in and of themselves make the third party action "related to" the
bankruptcy. 30 This principle even applies in the face of the well-settled
concept of promoting judicial economy, which alone "cannot justify a
court's finding jurisdiction over an otherwise unrelated suit." 3 1
In this analysis, it is important to remember that it is the relationship of
the dispute to the estate and not merely of one or more parties to the
estate that establishes jurisdiction.32 Perhaps the best example of this
concept can be found in In re Boone,33 in which the Eleventh Circuit held
that a debtor's suit against a creditor for tortious interference was not
related to the bankruptcy proceeding even though the tortious interfer-
ence claim shared common factual issues with one or more core bank-
ruptcy proceedings arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. 34
Again, it is the claim or legal issue itself that must support "related to "
jurisdiction, not the mere coincidence that the claim may involve the
debtor or even that it arose in the same fact situation or occurrence as
other "related to" or core proceedings.
27. Id. at 393. Vacatur is an equitable remedy available in exceptional circumstances,
which the Court found did not exist in a situation where the mootness resulted from volun-
tary settlement of the pending matter. Id.
28. 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995).
29. Id. at 751-55; see also In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1987).
30. Id at 753 (citing In re Boone, 52 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 1995) and Specialty Mills,
Inc. v. Citizen State Bank, 51 F.3d 770, 774 (8th Cir. 1995)).
31. Zale, 62 F.3d at 753-54.
32. Id at 755 (citing In re Xonics, 813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987)).
33. In re Boone, 52 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 1995).
34. In Boone, the debtors sued a lender for tortious interference with the sale of their
house. Even though the claim was brought with two other core proceedings and shared
common facts and parties with those proceedings, that was not enough to give the bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction over what was effectively a tort claim brought by the post petition,
post discharge debtors in their individual capacities that would have no impact whatsoever
on their Chapter 7 estate. Id. at 960-61 ("Although the claim to determine the extent of
the Bank's lien and the tortious interference claim will share the common factual issue...
this 'common issue of fact between a civil proceeding and a controversy involving the
bankruptcy estate does not bring the matter within the scope of § 1334(b)."')
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Finally, no analysis of the Fifth Circuit's view of these jurisdictional
issues would be complete without a review of its opinion in In re
Walker,35 in which a party, found in violation of section 362's automatic
stay, sought contribution from another party by way of a bankruptcy
court adversary proceeding. The Fifth Circuit found "related to" jurisdic-
tion lacking because even though the claim involved a violation of the
Bankruptcy Code, the dispute was purely between one creditor and an-
other party, and it had absolutely no impact upon the administration of
the estate or any assets of the estate. 36
C. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FIFTH CIRCUIT AND BELOW
1. Bankruptcy Rule Deadlines
The Fifth Circuit, in a seemingly innocuous per curium affirmance of a
Louisiana bankruptcy court, handed down an important ruling with re-
spect to filing deadlines found in the Bankruptcy Rules, in this instance in
the context of objections to exemptions. In In re Stoulig,37 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to grant an ex-
tension of the time to file objections to exemptions after the expiration of
the thirty day period prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b).38 In Stou-
lig, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, two days before the expiration of
the thirty day objection period, filed a motion for extension of that dead-
line. The bankruptcy judge failed to rule on the motion before the thirty
day period expired. After a hearing on the trustee's motion, the bank-
ruptcy court granted the deadline extension. But the district court re-
versed. 39 The district court's opinion provided what the Fifth Circuit
found to be a thorough analysis of the implications of granting such a
deadline extension under a rule providing a specific deadline.40 Essen-
tially, the district court found that the bankruptcy court no longer had
jurisdiction to grant the extension, even though the motion requesting the
extension was filed within the thirty day period. The district court felt
that the language of 4003(b) is unambiguous, as found by the Supreme
Court in a slightly different context in Taylor v. Freeland & Cronz.41 The
Court also noted other Fifth Circuit opinions interpreting time limitations
35. 51 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 1995).
36. Id. at 568-70 ("Cadle's claim against Svara has no 'conceivable effect on the ad-
ministration of the estate' nor would the outcome of that claim 'alter the debtor's rights,
liabilities, options, or freedom of action."')
The Fifth Circuit has issued yet one more opinion that touches upon "related to" juris-
diction. See In re Vitek, Inc., 51 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1995).
37. In re Stoulig, 45 F.3d 957 (5th Cir. 1995).
38. Id. at 957. Rule 4003(b) provides that objections to exemptions must be filed
within thirty days following the conclusion of the creditors' meeting. See FED. R. BANKR.
P. 4003(b).
39. Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1994).
40. Stoulig, 45 F.3d at 957-58.
41. 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (holding that the language of Rule 4003(b) is unambiguous,
the net effect of which was to allow debtor's exemption claims regardless of their statutory
basis if no objections are timely filed).
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provided by similarly unambiguous bankruptcy rules.42 The import of
this ruling is obvious. Under Stoulig, the cautious trustee or creditor's
counsel must be sure not only to seek the extension within the initial time
period, but to make absolutely sure that the requested extension is actu-
ally granted before that same deadline.
2. Retroactive Annulment of Automatic Stay
In In re Jones,43 the Fifth Circuit joined other courts in annulling or
granting nunc pro tunc relief from the automatic stay.44 In Jones, the
debtors filed a second Chapter 13 petition after the previous petition had
been dismissed. Unaware of the new bankruptcy, the mortgagees con-
ducted a foreclosure sale and purchased the property at the sale. The
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the debtors' assertion that the sale was void,
stating "[i]t is well settled that 'actions taken in violation of the automatic
stay are not void, but rather they are merely voidable, because the bank-
ruptcy court has the power to annul the automatic stay pursuant to sec-
tion 362(d).' 45 The Fifth Circuit further held that the court has the
"power to terminate, annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay."'46
Given that the mortgagees (who were not commercial lenders) received
neither actual or constructive notice of the bankruptcy filing, the Fifth
Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in af-
fording the retroactive relief found by way of annulment of the automatic
stay.47
3. Dischargeability-Collateral Estoppel
In In re Garner48, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of collateral
estoppel in a section 523 dischargeability context arising out of a state
court post answer default judgment. In Garner, Lehrer sued Garner in
state court. Garner filed an answer but did not appear for trial. After
Lehrer proceeded with trial and put on evidence, apparently in Garner's
absence, the state court entered a judgment finding in part that the de-
42. Stoulig, 169 B.R. at 601. For the cases cited by Stoulig dealing with this issue, see
In re Kolstad, 928 F.2d 171, 173-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 958 (1991) (Rule 3004);
In re McGuirt, 879 F.2d 182, 183-84 (5th Cir. 1989) (Rule 4007(c)); In re Robintech, Inc.,
863 F.2d 393, 395-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989) (Rule 9006(f)); Neely v.
Murchison, 815 F.2d 345, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rule 4007(c)).
43. Jones v. Garcia (In re Jones), 63 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 1995).
44. See, e.g., In re Bresler, 119 B.R. 400 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1990) (Duberstein, C.J.)(automatic stay lifted nunc pro tunc to validate a foreclosure sale conducted one day after
filing); see also, In re Calder, 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1990) (proof of claim allowed based on
state court judgment entered after bankruptcy petition filed); In re Albany Partners, Ltd.,
749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1984) (bankruptcy courts have power to "annul" stay, including
retroactive validation of acts in violation of stay); In re Philgo Realty Co., 185 B.R. 676,
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y., 1995) (nunc pro tunc relief from the automatic stay based in part on the
debtor having remained "stealthily silent").
45. In re Jones, 63 F.3d at 412 (quoting Picco v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d
846, 850 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 413.
47. Id.
48. Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner), 56 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 1995).
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fendants "acted with spite, ill-will, and malice."'49 The court awarded ac-
tual and punitive damages.50 After Garner filed for Chapter 7 relief
nearly a year later, Lehrer sought to have his judgment determined non-
dischargeable. In that adversary proceeding, Lehrer sought summary
judgment based upon the state court judgment, which the bankruptcy
court granted.51 In giving the state court judgment full faith and credit,52
the Fifth Circuit applied Texas rules of preclusion as they pertain to col-
lateral estoppel, which "bars relitigation of any ultimate issue of fact actu-
ally litigated and essential to the judgment in a prior suit, regardless of
whether the second suit is based upon the same cause of action. '53 Spe-
cifically, Texas law requires that for collateral estoppel to apply, the facts
to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the
prior action, those facts were essential to the first judgment, and the par-
ties were adversaries in the first action.54
Therefore, the issue was whether a post answer default judgment could
give rise to collateral estoppel in a dischargeability context. The Fifth
Circuit found that it can, noting some distinction between a simple de-
fault judgment where the non-answering party has essentially admitted
facts plead against him and a post answer default, which "constitutes
neither an abandonment of defendant's answer nor an implied confession
of any issues thus joined by the defendant's answer. ' 55 The Court noted
that under Texas law, in a post-answer default judgment situation, judg-
ment cannot be entered on the pleadings, but the plaintiff is required to
offer evidence and prove his case, which Lehrer did in the state court. 56
The other issue faced by the Fifth Circuit was whether the state court's
findings of "spite, ill-will, and malice" constituted a finding of "willful and
malicious injury" within the meaning of section 523's exceptions to dis-
charge.57 The Fifth Circuit found that it does, having defined "willful and
malicious" under section 523 to mean "without just cause or excuse. '58
In other words "[w]illful means intentional[,] and malicious adds the ab-
sence of just cause or excuse."' 59 Moreover, under Texas law, malice
"means ill-will or evil motive or such gross indifference or reckless disre-
gard for the rights of others as to amount to wanton and willful action
49. Id. at 678.
50. Id. at 681.
51. Id. at 679.
52. Id
53. Garner, 56 F.3d at 679 (quoting Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d
816, 818 (Tex. 1984)).
54. Id at 680.
55. Id (quoting Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979)).
56. Id
57. Section 523 provides numerous exceptions to discharge, one of which is a debt "for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994).




knowingly and unreasonably done."' 60 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the state court's findings included a determination that Garner acted
with malice, noting also the fact that the state court awarded punitive
damages.61
Under Garner, it is clear that collateral estoppel is still alive and well in
the context of dischargeability litigation, even when the underlying judg-
ment is in the nature of a post answer default. What Garner does not
directly address is a situation in which a default judgment has been en-
tered in the absence of an answer. Under Garner, it would seem possible
that collateral estoppel might operate even where a default judgment is
taken when there has been no answer, because many claims resulting in
section 523 complaints involve unliquidated damages which must be
"proven up" in the state court proceeding even in the absence of an an-
swer. The lessons for the state court practitioner are obvious: from the
plaintiff's perspective section 523 issues should be taken into account at
both the drafting stage and if, and when, it becomes necessary to prove
facts and obtain a finding from the court or fact finder. From the defend-
ant's perspective, it is now clear that a failure to appear may result in a
judgment that could be ultimately nondischargeable. 62
4. Exemptions-Tools of the Trade
In In re Henry63, bankruptcy judge John C. Akard 64 allowed a debtor
to avoid a lien against a welder, notwithstanding the fact that the debtor
only welded on a part time basis at the time he purchased the welder.
The court determined that Congress intended the phrase "tools of the
trade of the debtor"65 to have a "common sense interpretation on a case-
by-case basis with the key inquiry focusing on the necessity of an item to
the individual debtor's particular business or employment. '66 The court
also reiterated that the determination of whether and to what extent an
60. Id. (quoting Dahl v. Akin, 645 S.W.2d 506, 515 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982), affd,
661 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938 (1984)).
61. Id. The Court noted that under Texas law, punitive damages are available only if
the claimant proves that the harm resulted from either fraud, malice, or gross negligence.
By elimination, the Fifth Circuit noted the district court's finding that the litigation did not
involve allegations of fraud or gross negligence, therefore the exemplary damage award
was based on malice. Id. at 682.
62. As was the case before Garner, counsel must always be vigilant in any state court
fraud or related litigation in preparing the charge and/or jury questions or findings of fact
and conclusions of law if they could ultimately have section 523 implications.
63. 183 B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 1995).
64. Judge Akard has issued numerous opinion pertaining to homesteads, exemptions
and, in particular, tools of the trade. See, e.g., In re Legg, 164 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1995) (tools of the trade); see also In re Nerios, 171 B.R. 224 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994)
(adjoining residences); In re Cate, 170 B.R. 582 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (multiple residen-
tial lots); In re Julian, 163 B.R. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994) (urban homestead-multiple
lots). See generally R. Cox, Bankruptcy & Creditors Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
48 SMU L. REv. 875, 898-905. (1995).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(i)(B)(ii) (1994).




exemption should be allowed is based upon the date which the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed.67
The Henry court also addressed whether and to what extent the lien
was for purchase money. The court found that the original loan, which
had subsequently been refinanced with the advance of some additional
funds, was not purchase money.68 This finding was due in part to the fact
that the agent who made the loan did not testify, nor apparently did the
retailer from whom the welder was purchased. Accordingly, this lack of
evidence led the court to the conclusion that there was no evidence that it
was a purchase money loan.69 Therefore, the issue of whether and to
what extent a refinancing renders an original purchase money loan non-
purchase money was not addressed.
5. Rash (Collateral Valuation in Bankruptcy) Update
The Fifth Circuit has modified In re Rash,70 a case addressed in last
year's survey71, to delete as dicta a substantial portion of its previous
opinion. In its opinion on petition for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit reiter-
ated its holding that valuation of personal property collateral in a reor-
ganization context should be based upon the retail value of that
collateral.72 The Fifth Circuit cited other opinions following its initial
Rash decision, including those coming out of the Eighth Circuit73 and the
First Circuit.74 The Rash saga is not over, however, because the Fifth
Circuit has granted rehearing en banc.7 5
6. Abstracts of Judgment
In re Davis7 6 provides a reminder of the pitfalls of recording an inade-
67. Idl at 750-51.
68. Id. at 750.
69. Id. at 749-50. A purchase money security interest is defined as one that is taken or
retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price or is taken by a
person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor
to purchase the collateral. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.107. Refinancing of the
original purchase money does not destroy its purchase money character. See TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art 5069-6.02(12) (Vernon 1987) (holder of retail installment contract may
agree to one or more amendments to extend or defer due dates); see also In re Crispin, 139
B.R. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) (consolidation and refinancing of purchase money does
not destroy purchase money nature under Consumer Credit Code). But see In re Hrncirik,
138 B.R. 835 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (bank advanced funds to make two tractor payments;
held non-purchase money).
70. 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 1995).
71. 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 1994); see R. Cox, Bankruptcy & Creditor's Rights, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REv. 875, 885 (1995).
72. Rash, 62 F.3d at 685.
73. See In re Trimble, 50 F.3rd 530 (8th Cir. 1995) (following Rash and applying retail
value).
74. See In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 1995) (hypotheti-
cal foreclosure value inappropriate in reorganization context; following reasoning in Rash);
see also In re McClurkin, 31 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1994) (decided before initial Rash opinion
issued, but declining to deduct hypothetical cost of sale in Chapter 13 proceeding).
75. In re Rash, 68 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1995).
76. 174 B.R. 223 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
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quate abstract of judgment. In Davis, the abstract of judgment omitted,
inter alia, the defendant's address and/or other information regarding the
citation and service thereof.77 The Davis opinion provides an excellent
review of the state law that creates judgment liens by recording an ab-
stract. Fundamentally, however, "a judgment lien will not attach unless a
judgment creditor takes the steps necessary to comply with § 52.003 of
the Texas Property Code",78 which mandates the contents of an abstract
of judgment. 79 Based upon what it found to be well established Texas
Law, the Davis court held that the omission of one or more mandatory
elements of an abstract of judgment may be fatal to the creation and at-
tachment of a judgment lien.80
7. Federal v. State Limitations81
In Davidson v. FDIC,82 the Fifth Circuit addressed whether general
federal statutory limitations apply to deed of trust foreclosure actions.
The court found that the general statute of limitations83 does not apply to
mortgage foreclosures but rather is limited to actions for money damages
(which would include an action on the underlying indebtedness). 84
The Davidson court found that state law should govern the rights held
by the FDIC in its limited capacity as the receiver of a non-federal en-
tity.85 The bottom line in Davidson, however, was that because the un-
derlying indebtedness was still alive and enforceable under FIRREA, the
receiver had the right to foreclose cutting off even a bona fide purchaser,
despite the fact that the state statute expressly provided for a four year
limitation on real property foreclosures.86 Despite the rather straightfor-
77. Id. at 225.
78. Id. at 226.
79. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.003 (Vernon Supp. 1996) other provisions of Chapter
52 of the Property Code specify other environments for recording, indexing, and satisfac-
tion of judgment liens.
80. Id. at 227-28; see, e.g., Citicorp Real Estate v. Banque Arabe Internationale
D'investissement, 747 S.W.2d 926 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
81. The Federal Statutes of Limitations under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) and otherwise are discussed infra notes 131-
39.
82. 44 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1995).
83. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2415(a) (West 1995) (general statute of limitations applicable to
actions by United States).
84. Davidson, 44 F.3d at 249. The court noted, however, that the FIRREA statute
does apply to foreclosure actions. Id. at 249 n.2. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(14) (West
1994), which has no "for money damages" limitations as is contained in § 2415(a). "Thus it
is clear that FIRREA applies to foreclosure actions." Id.
85. Davidson, 44 F.3d at 250. The court noted that the capacity in which the FDIC
acts may have an impact on whether state or federal law should apply. The court noted
further that strong state interest such as regulation of land titles should "be overridden by
the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National Government,
which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major
damage if the state law is applied." Id. at 252 n.4 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341, 352-54 (1966) (family law case)); see also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048
(1994) (tort claim against former counsel for failed savings and loan).
86. Davidson 44 F.3d at 253-55; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 16.0035 (Vernon
Supp. 1996).
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ward outcome in Davidson, Davidson is mandatory reading for the Fifth
Circuit's current view regarding the interplay between state and federal
law in the context of the FDIC acting in the limited capacity as a receiver.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STATE COURTS AND
LEGISLATURE
A. STATE COURTS
During the Survey period, there were few significant debtor-creditor
developments in state courts. Rather, the Survey period provided a
number of examples of issues that are litigated in the course of creditor's
rights and remedies. Some of those decisions are worthy of note not so
much for any change or expansion of Texas law, but rather as examples of
fairly common issues about which debtor and creditor counsel should be
aware.
1. Foreclosure Notice
Two cases illustrate the problems inherent in providing notice of fore-
closure sales, especially in the context of deficiency enforcement after
such sales. WTFO, Inc. v. Braithwaite 87 deals with the notice require-
ments necessary to support recovery of a deficiency after a foreclosure
sale. Before a holder of a debt is entitled to a deficiency judgment, the
holder must prove that a valid foreclosure sale was conducted, including
that notice of the sale was sent to the debtor prior to the sale in accord-
ance with the Texas Property Code. 88 In order to establish violation of
the statute, the plaintiff must show that the holder of the debt had posses-
sion of the most recent address of the debtor and failed to mail the notice
by certified mail to that address. 89 Unfortunately, Braithwaite was a sum-
mary judgment case, and the FDIC (the prior owner of the note) failed to
comply with the summary judgment requirement of a timely filed contro-
verting affidavit, so it is not known what was contained therein. Based
upon the record before the court, however, the court found that the
FDIC had the borrower's most current address on file but failed to send
the notice to that address. 90 Based upon that fact, the court affirmed the
summary judgment granted to the borrower based on the FDIC's failure
to provide notice of the sale.91
In First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Farley,92 a somewhat different result
87. 899 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
88. Id. at 719-20; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
89. Braithwaite, 899 S.W.2d at 720; see also, Onwuteaka v. Cohen, 846 S.W.2d 889, 892
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
90. Braithwaite, 899 S.W.2d at 720.
91. Id.
92. 895 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied). The court also reit-
erates the well established requirements for establishing ownership of a note:
[t]estimony in an affidavit that a particular person or entity owns a note is
sufficient to conclusively establish ownership even in the absence of support-
ing documentation if there is no controverting summary judgment evidence.
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was reached in part because the noteholder did not have a correct ad-
dress for the party to whom the notice was to be sent. Specifically, notice
of a scheduled foreclosure sale was sent to a liable party but which was
returned with a notation that the person's forwarding address had ex-
pired. Apparently, the lender rescheduled the sale, but did not provide a
new notice to the liable party because the lender did not have a current
address for him. Essentially, the lender's position was that because it had
no known address for that person, it was not required to send a notice
letter. The appellate court found that there was a fact issue regarding
notice to that person, and it reversed the lower court's summary judg-
ment in favor of that guarantor. The court stated that the lender "made a
good faith effort to comply with the notice provision" but that it had no
known address for that guarantor.93 The lesson to be learned in
Braithwaite and Farley is simply that the prudent lender must be aware of
the property code requirement that the notice of substitute trustee's sale
must be sent to "the debtor's last known address as shown by the records
of the holder of the debt."'94 Accordingly, the safer practice for lender's
counsel is to require the lender to provide counsel with not only the ad-
dress contained in the loan documents, but all addresses of which the
lender is aware or are reflected in its files. Of course, this address re-
quirement applies to all persons entitled to notice under the deed of trust
or the property code.95
2. Effect of Foreclosure on Lessee
Also in the context of real property foreclosure, ICM Mortgage Corp.
v. Jacob96 dealt with foreclosure on a property occupied by a third party
tenant. Jacob simply provides that when a tenant's landlord is foreclosed
upon by the landlord's mortgagee, the general rule is that the tenant's
lease is terminated.97 The court analyzes in detail, whether and to what
extent there exist exceptions to this general rule (and for that matter
whether the general rule is indeed the general rule); however, the net
effect of Jacob is that the general rule remains the same: the tenant's
lease is generally terminated upon foreclosure. In Jacob, the tenant ap-
parently became a "tenant at sufferance," which is effectively an occupant
in naked possession of property. 98 The court noted the possibility that a
[citation omitted] A photocopy of a note attached to the affidavit of the
holder, who swears that it is a true and correct copy of the note, is sufficient
as a matter of law to prove the status of owner and holder of a note absent
controverting summary judgment evidence.
Id. at 428. The case also points out, however, that an issue of material fact may be present
"when there is an unexplained gap in the chain of title" to the note. Id
93. Id. at 430.
94. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(e) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
95. Another case of interest regarding notice of sale in a personal property context is
Wilson v. GMAC, 897 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
96. 902 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1994, no writ).




new landlord tenant relationship could evolve after foreclosure. 99 How-
ever, there was no evidence that one existed in this case. Therefore, the
court held that the foreclosing lender owed no duty to the tenant that
would give rise to the tenant's claims for a variety of damages. 100 The
reader is reminded, however, that there are certain notice requirements
contained in the Texas Property Code with respect to forcible entry and
detainer actions following a foreclosure sale where a tenant under an ex-
isting lease is in possession of the building. 101
3. Renewals/Forbearance Agreements
Two cases are worthy of note in the context of renewal and extension
agreements and forbearance agreements. In Rosedale Partners, Ltd. v.
Walters, 02 the borrowers were successful in establishing an affirmative
defense of novation based upon a written forbearance agreement entered
into after a judgment. 0 3 Effectively, both the prior judgment and the for-
bearance agreement provided certain rights to foreclose on property,
leading the court to believe that the obligation under the forbearance
agreement extinguished the obligation under the prior judgment because
the two obligations could not co-exist. 104
That is not to say, however, that giving a new note or signing a renewal
and extension agreement extinguishes a prior note. To the contrary,
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bosler,0 5 makes clear that "the giving of a new note
for debt evidenced by a former note does not extinguish the old note
unless expressed by the parties."' 0 6 Moreover, the holder may sue on
either the original note or the renewal note. 07
In Bosler, the renewal agreement contained an express non-recourse
provision under which the maker of the note and its partners were ex-
pressly absolved from personal liability on the note. The court found,
however, that the renewal agreement extinguished neither the old note
nor the guaranty obligations thereunder. 08 More specifically, the court
found that the continuing guaranty agreements executed by various indi-
99. Id. at 531-32.
100. Id at 533-34.
101. See TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(b) (Vernon 1996) (thirty day written notice
requirement to tenant who timely pays rent and is not otherwise in default under the ten-
ant's lease).
102. 905 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
103. According to the court:
To be entitled to a summary judgment on the basis of the affirmative defense
of novation, a movant must conclusively prove the following elements: 1) the
validity of a previous obligation, 2) an agreement among all parties to accept
a new contract, 3) the extinguishment of the previous obligation, and 4) the
validity of the new agreement.
Id at 19.
104. Id. at 20.
105. 906 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1995, writ requested).
106. Id. at 643.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 644.
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viduals remained in full force and effect.1°9
4. Garnishment and the Automatic Stay
In Baytown State Bank v. Nimmons,110 the appellate court found that a
garnishment action is stayed by the bankruptcy of the underlying debtor.
According to Nimmons, a garnishee bank "in effect holds the debtor's
property as an officer or receiver for the court." [citation omitted] Ser-
vice of the writ of garnishment creates a lien on the judgment debtor's
property, impounding the funds in the hands of the garnishee bank."1 1
In Nimmons, the garnishment proceeding had concluded with the entry
of a judgment against the garnishee bank (based on the bank's answer).
But, the court found that a garnishment judgment, just like any other
judgment, is not self-executing.' 12 The court further noted that in Texas,
ownership of property subject to a judgment does not transfer until a writ
of execution is levied. 113 Therefore, the court found that the judgment
debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing deprived the trial court of jurisdic-
tion to enforce the garnishment judgment and automatically stayed the
garnishor's right to enforce the judgment. 14
5. Federal Limitations with a Twist
By now, it has become well settled that an assignee of the FDIC ac-
quires the six year federal statute of limitation provided by the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIR-
REA"), along with other rights arising under that or other federal stat-
utes. 115 In General Financial Serv. v. Practice Place1 6, the court upheld a
temporary injunction issued in part because it appeared that the note-
holder's predecessor in interest may have retained or reserved some or all
109. Id. at 643-44. The court also found that a limitation defense was not available,
again based upon one of the modification agreements. Finally, the court also reiterated the
general rule regarding recovery on a promissory note:
To recover on a promissory note, a plaintiff must establish the note at issue,
that the defendant signed the note, that the plaintiff is the legal owner and
holder of the note and that a certain balance is due and owing. [citation
omitted] The same proof that establishes a plaintiff's right to summary judg-
ment on a promissory note also establishes the plaintiff's right to summaryjudgment on a guaranty. [citation omitted]
Id. at 645.
110. 904 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ pending).
111. Id. at 906.
112. Id. "The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in garnishment actions 'exe-
cution shall issue thereon in the same manner and under the same conditions as is or may
be provided for the issuance of execution in other cases."' Id. (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 668
(Vernon Supp. 1996)).
113. Nimmons, 904 S.W.2d at 907.
114. Id.
115. See Jackson v. Thweat, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 196(1994); see also, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(14) (West 1989) (six year federal statute arising
under FIRREA). This was based upon the fundamental concept that an "assignee stands
in the shoes of his assignor." Id. at 174 (quoting FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 810 (5th
Cir. 1993)).
116. 897 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
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of the federal powers in assigning the note to the current noteholder.
Although this was an injunction case and the underlying substantive issue
was not ultimately resolved, this case was consistent with the Dallas
Court of Appeals holding in Cadle Co. v. Estate of Weaver.117 In Weaver,
the Dallas Court of Appeals held that such a restricted assignment did in




Section 51.003(a) of the Texas Property Code provides that if real
property is sold at a foreclosure sale for less than the unpaid balance,
"any action brought to recover the deficiency must be brought within two
years of the foreclosure sale and is governed by this Section." 119 In
Trunkill Capital, Inc. v. Jansma,120 the Waco Court of Appeals was faced
with the question of whether that statute is a statute of repose or a statute
of limitations. That court found that it was a statute of limitations. The
court cited recent Texas Supreme Court authority distinguishing between
a statute of repose, which begins to run from a specified date without
regard to the accrual of a cause of action, and a statute of limitations,
which is a procedural limitation on the enforcement of a cause of action
by one who actually possesses a cause of action.' 21 Unlike a statute of
repose, "[a] statute of limitations runs not from a specified independent
date, but from the date the cause of action accrues."'1 22 The significance
of this distinction is that the creditor's cause of action for a deficiency
exists and begins running on the date of the foreclosure and runs for the
following two year period. 23
7. Judgment Enforcement-Attorney's Fees
In Great Global Assur. Co. v. Keltex Properties, Inc.,124 the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's denial of attorney's fees
to a judgment creditor who had successfully pursued an action under the
Texas turnover statute. At the risk of oversimplification, it is safe to say
that the court found that the award of attorney's fees to a successful judg-
ment creditor under the turnover statute is essentially mandatory.125 The
117. 897 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
118. Id. at 179.
119. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003(a) (Vernon 1995).
120. 905 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. App.-Waco 1995, writ pending).
121. Id at 467 (citing Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, 889 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.
1994)).
122. Jansma, 905 S.W.2d at 467.
123. Id. at 468.
124. 904 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
125. Id. at 775-76. The turnover statute provides that "the judgment creditor is entitled
to reasonable costs, including attorney's fees." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 31.002(e) (Vernon 1986); see also id. §§ 38.001-.006; see generally Cortland Line Co., Inc.
v. Israel, 874 S.W.2d 178, 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (noting
that the award of attorney's fees is mandatory under Chapter 38 if there is proof of reason-
ableness of the fees). The court further noted that "[a] court has the discretion to fix the
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court further held that the judgment creditor's apparent failure to make
attempts to collect the judgment through another legal process, although
a consideration in determining reasonableness of the fees, is not a basis to
deny a request for fees under the turnover statute.126
8. No Fiduciary Relationship Between Bank and Customer
Finally, no survey of Texas debtor-creditor law would be complete
without noting at least one case in which a borrower has attempted to
impose a fiduciary relationship on a bank-customer relationship. In
Berry v. First National Bank of Olney,127 the Berrys alleged facts to sup-
port their claim that a fiduciary relationship existed between them and
their bank. The court of appeals noted that although the alleged facts
supported a possible breach of a fiduciary relationship and those facts
(knowledge of collateral value, superior bargaining power, and represen-
tations by the banker) 128 may have been evidence of the breach of a fidu-
ciary relationship, but they were absolutely no evidence of the existence
of a fiduciary relationship. 129 Berry is yet another reminder that a rela-
tionship between a bank and its customer generally does not create a
special or fiduciary relationship.130
9. More Federal Limitations
The federal statutes of limitation were also at issue in Amwest Savings
Ass'n v. Shatto.'3 ' The Austin Court of Appeals reiterated the well-es-
tablished rule discussed above: FIRREA's statute of limitation is avail-
able to assignees of the government. More specifically, the plaintiff was
the assignee of the FSLIC as opposed to the FDIC. The court noted,
however, that FIRREA "makes clear that the FDIC succeeds to the
FSLIC's rights and obligations as receiver. 132
Two other concepts are brought out in the Shatto opinion. First, Shatto
is an instructive reminder that limitations is an affirmative defense, which
in a summary judgment context requires conclusive proof of all of the
amount of attorney's fees, but it does not have the discretion in denying them if they are
proper under § 38.001." Id. Chapter 38, the general attorney's fees statute, apparently
governs claims for attorney's fees under the turnover statute. See Carlyle Real Estate Ltd.
Partnership-X. v. Leibman, 782 S.W.2d 230,233 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ
denied).
126. Keltex, 904 S.W.2d at 776.
127. 894 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1995, no writ).
128. Specifically, the borrowers alleged that the bank had knowledge and possession of
a substantially lower appraisal for the subject real property, the bank had superior knowl-
edge of the area surrounding the real property, the bank's superior bargaining power pre-
cluded the Berrys from exploring independent appraisal opportunities, and the banker's
representation that the property was "a good deal" changed the bank's role from a mere
creditor to an advisor. Id. at 560.
129. Id
130. Id.; see also Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962); Manufacturers
Hanover Tust Co. v. Kingston Investors Corp., 819 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 1991, no writ).
131. 905 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ requested).
132. Id. at 404.
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elements of that affirmative defense or disproving at least one of the ele-
ments of the plaintiff's cause of action as a matter of law. 133 Second,
Shatto reiterates the rules that the Texas Supreme Court expressly stated
in Jackson v. Thweatt:134 that FIRREA's statute of limitation does not
create a new limitation scheme, "but merely clarifies for federal receivers
the existing six year statute of limitations applicable to the federal gov-
ernment generally under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1988)." 135 This distinction
is not inconsequential because section 2415(a) contains a number of pro-
visions regarding tolling or renewing limitations. 136
In Holstein v. Federal Debt Management, Inc. ,137 the Houston Court of
Appeals dealt with somewhat similar issues, also finding that FIRREA's
six year statute of limitations applied to the note purchaser/plaintiff. 138
Additionally, the court analyzed the issue of due diligence in securing
service of process, finding that the plaintiff's summary judgment evidence
provided uncontroverted facts setting forth a reasonable explanation for
a three month delay in obtaining service of process. 139
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
It is tempting to say that there was little in the way of statutory devel-
opment in the areas of debt collection and the debtor-creditor relation-
ship. The legislature was quite active, however, and some statutory
amendments of interest were enacted. Perhaps the most important revi-
sion from the debtor-creditor perspective is found in the amendments to
Chapter 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with negotiable in-
struments. 140 Although these revisions are addressed in the survey article
on banking law, one amendment deals directly with enforcement of the
debtor-creditor relationship.
Specifically, the amended Article 3 now contains an expanded statute
of limitations for bringing suits on negotiable instruments, particularly
promissory notes.' 41 Chapter 3 now provides that an action to enforce a
note "payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years af-
ter the due date or dates stated in the note, or if a due date is accelerated,
within six years after the accelerated due date.' 42
The amendments also provide specific limitations for demand notes.
According to the amended Chapter 3, if demand is made on a demand
133. Id. at 403.
134. 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994).
135. Shatto, 905 S.W.2d at 404 (citing Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Tex.
1994)).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (Vernon 1988) (e.g., renewal or tolling of limitations on
partial payment, acknowledgement of debt, etc.).
137. 902 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st dist.] 1995, no writ).
138. Id. at 34.
139. Id at 36; see also id. n.1.
140. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.101-5.114 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
141. Id. § 3.118.
142. 1& § 3.118(a).
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note, an action must be brought within six years after the demand.143
Additionally, in the absence of a demand, the statute provides that an
action on a demand note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the
note has been paid "for a continuous period of 10 years. ' 144
The Uniform Commercial code comment and the State Bar Committee
comments following the published amendments raise some of the more
obvious questions. For example, issues of statutory interpretation will
surely arise with respect to conflicting statutes of limitations found in the
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code and elsewhere. For example,
whether specific statutes like the four year limitations period regarding
real estate lien debt controls over the new six year negotiable instrument
limitation remains to be seen.' 45 Likewise, retroactive application to ex-
isting notes may also be an issue.' 46 Obviously, the interpretation and
application of these issues as they affect promissory notes and other nego-
tiable instruments may be resolved only by the courts. Meanwhile, how-
ever, the practitioner must not overlook these Chapter 3 amendments.
Chapter 51 of the Texas Property Code has been amended to address
the situation involving foreclosure of a deed of trust lien after acceptance
of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The new section 51.006 provides that the
holder of a deed of trust lien who accepts from the debtor a deed in lieu
of foreclosure may void that deed in lieu on or before the fourth anniver-
sary of the date the deed is executed if the debtor fails to disclose the
existence of a lien or other encumbrance and the deed in lieu grantee has
no actual knowledge of the undisclosed lien or encumbrance.' 47
The amendment further provides that a third party may conclusively
rely on the affidavit of the lienholder stating that the lienholder has
voided the deed. 48 Most importantly, the statute recognizes that the pri-
ority of the original deed of trust lien will not be affected or impaired by
the execution of the deed in lieu of foreclosure, and the lienholder may
foreclose its deed of trust as provided therein without electing to void the
deed. 149 Again, the priority of the deed of trust would not be affected or
impaired by the deed in lieu. Effectively, this practice provides for an
expressed statutory recognition of deeds in lieu of foreclosure. 50
Also of interest to the secured lender are the rather substantial amend-
ments to the Texas Probate Code regarding the filing and allowance of
secured claims in a probate proceeding.' 51 Analysis of the Texas Probate
Code is beyond the scope of this article. However, the amendments will
have a direct impact upon any secured lender attempting to enforce a
143. Id.- § 3.118(b).
144. ld.
145. See id. cmt. (State Bar Committee).
146. Id
147. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.006(b)(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
148. Id § 51.006(c).
149. Id. § 51.006(d)-(e).
150. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.006(e).
151. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 146 (Vernon Supp. 1996)
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claim against a decedent's estate.152
With respect to judgments, the legislature has attempted to correct the
apparent anomaly arising from the old statute that provided that a judg-
ment could become dormant if execution was not issued within twelve
months after the date of the judgment. In amending section 31.006 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the legislature has now provided that
a dormant judgment may be revived not later than the second anniver-
sary of the date that the judgment becomes dormant. The reference to
execution not having been issued within twelve months after the date of
the judgment has been deleted. 153
Among other amendments, the legislature has amended statutes per-
taining to aircraft storage liens, motor vehicle repairs 154 , and vehicle stor-
age facilities.' 55 Finally, there were extensive revisions to Chapter 4 of
the Texas Business & Commerce Code dealing with bank deposits and
collections. Obviously, those revisions are beyond the scope of this arti-
cle; however, they are addressed in the survey article on banking law. 156
IV. CONSUMER CREDIT
A. APPLICABILITY OF FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT TO
LAWYERS1 5
7
In a long awaited decision, the United States Supreme Court finally
dealt with the issue of whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 58
"[a]pplies to a lawyer who 'regularly,' through litigation, tries to collect
consumer debts."'51 9 In Heintz v. Jenkins, 60 the Supreme Court held that
it does.
The Court mentioned two reasons for applying the Act to litigation
activities of lawyers. First, Justice Breyer points out that "in ordinary
English, a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of consumer
debts through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly 'attempts' to
'collect' those consumer debts.' 161 Second, the Court noted the 1986 re-
152. Id. § 146(a)(1). The amendments also address notice to unsecured creditors and
other issues.
153. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.006 (Vernon Supp. 1996); see also TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.006 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (a judgment lien continues for ten years
following recording and indexing of an abstract of judgment unless the judgment becomes
dormant during that period).
154. Id. § 70.001 (transfer of refused check; location of vehicle repossessed after tender
of insufficient check).
155. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-9a, § 14a (Vernon Supp. 1996) (payment by
lienholder or insurance company).
156. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.01 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996); James W.
Doyle, Banking Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L. REv. 695 (1996).
157. For a concise overview of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, see L. Lucas &
A. Harrell, What You Should Know About the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
18 Tex. Bank. Lawyer No. 11 (Texas Ass'n of Bank Counsel, April 1995).
158. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692 - 1692(o) (West 1988 and Supp. V).
159. Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995) (emphasis added by court).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1491.
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peal of the exemption that formally applied to lawyers. 162 This holding
ignores some legislative history to the contrary, given what the Court
found to be the plain language of the statute itself.163
The net effect of Heintz is that the Act now clearly applies to attorneys
who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activity, "even when
that activity consists of litigation.' ' 164 The only way this can be rectified is
by much needed amendment to the statute. 65
B. INAPPLICABILITY OF CONSUMER CREDIT LAWS TO COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS
First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Smith166 cannot be described as a signifi-
cant development. However, the common sense approach the court
takes in the case provides some reassurance for the commercial lender
and counsel. In Smith, the district court apparently dismissed a bor-
rower's claim under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
the Texas Debt Collection Act because the loan in question was commer-
cial in nature. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, reiterating that both statutes
deal with debts incurred for personal, family, or household purposes or
otherwise arising out of consumer transactions. 67 Another apparent red
herring raised by the debtor was the fact that First Gibraltar had obtained
the indebtedness from another lender, so it was a "debt collector" under
the federal statutes. 68 The Fifth Circuit did not analyze that issue in
depth, but simply found that First Gibraltar was doing nothing more than
"attempting to enforce an obligation under a guaranty agreement in con-
nection with a commercial transaction.'1 69 Again, the Smith opinion
does little more than state the obvious. Hopefully, this ruling may pro-
vide lower courts and debtor/creditor counsel some direction in avoiding
unnecessary litigation over what should be a well-settled issue arising out
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1492. According to the opinion, Congressman Frank Annunzio, one of the
sponsors of the Amendment noted that the Act "regulates debt collection, not the practice
of law .... The act applies to attorneys when they are collecting debts, not when they are
performing tasks of a legal nature . Id. (citing 132 Cong. Rec. 30842 (1986)).
164. Id. at 1493.
165. The Court found unpersuasive the lawyer's arguments concerning the myriad
anomalies presented by literal application of the Act's provisions to litigation activities.
See id. at 1491-92 (limitations or communications with the debtor, etc.).
166. 62 F.3d 133 (5th Cir. 1995).
167. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a debt is defined as: "[Any obliga-
tion or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which
the money, property, insurance, or services.., are primarily for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(5) (1995) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Texas Debt Collection Act defines a
debt as "any obligation or alleged obligation arising out of a consumer transaction." TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, § 11.01(a) (Vernon 1987). A consumer is defined as "an
individual who owes or allegedly owes a debt created primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes." Id. art. 5069, § 11.01(d).
168. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act defines a debt collector as one who "regu-
larly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to
be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6) (West Supp. 1995).
169. Smith, 62 F.3d at 136.
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of unambiguous statutory language limiting these state and federal stat-
utes to protecting the only transactions they were intended to protect:
consumer transactions.

